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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALLEN WILLDEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

.

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, PEARL LANCE and
LEE CECIL HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11925

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This appeal involves the questions of whether
or not the Utah Guest Statute governing the standard of care owed by the host driver to his guest also
sets the standard of care for a continuing course of
first aid treatment which does not relate to the manner in which the vehicle is driven, and
Whether the standard of care and duty owed
by the driver of an ambulance for hire to his paying
passenger is established by the Utah Guest Statute.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The matter came before the lower court pursuant to defendant Kennecott Copper Corporation's
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Motion for Summary Judgment upon the grounds
that plaintiff was a Guest in defendant's ambulance.
(R. 85).
The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision
and granted Summary Judgment to defendants,
Kennecott Copper Corporation. (R. 103 and 120).
Plaintiff appeals from the Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the following relief on appeal:

1. A determination that negligent acts occurring during a continuing course of treatment not related to the manner in which the driver of a vehicle
operates the vehicle are not governed by the Utah
Guest Statute.
2. Determination that the Utah Guest Statute
does not apply to ambulances.
3. Determination that appellant was a passenger in respondent's vehicle for hire rather than a
guest.
4. Determination that the term "Acceptance" as
used in the Utah Guest Statute, requires a conscious
or knowing affirmation of assent to the ride offered
in the vehicle of another.
5. That there were sufficient disputed material
facts raised in the lower court to require submission
of the case to the ultimate trier of fact.
6. Setting aside the Summary Judgment of the
trial court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Allen Willden, was an employee of
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, performing work
in behalf of his employer at Bingham Canyon, Utah.
On July 7, 1965, appellant suffered an industrial accident and was taken to an emergency medical facility located at Bingham Canyon, Utah, which
facility was owned, staffed and operated by Kennecott Copper Corporation. Appellant was in a state
of shock and was experiencing severe and excruciating pain, having lost part of his hand. At the
facility, Mr. Willden received first aid and was given
a shot of demerol, a narcotic drug that has a dulling
and depressing effect. As a part of the continuing
course of treatment undertaken by Kennecott Copper Corporation, appellant was then placed, without his consent, into an ambulance owned and operated by Kennecott Copper Corporation. He was
placed in the respondent's ambulance by respondent's employees. Respondent's employees then
transported appellant to the Salt Lake City area for
hospitalization. (R-22-29).
On the way to the hospital, the respondent's
ambulance was involved in an intersection collision.
The appellant was not properly secured in the ambulance and was thrown about because of the collision. The appellant alleges that the collision caused
neck and back injuries to appellant. (R. 22-26) There
is a factual dispute as to whether or not respondent's
employees used the siren and flashing lights on the
ambulance when they approached the intersection
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where the collision took place. The respondent's employee driver did not apply his brakes immediately
upon approaching the intersection, even though the
intersection light did not turn green until one (1)
car length prior to defendant driver's entry into the
intersection.
Respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation's
employee driver had been on shift for a full eight
(8) hours and was, in fact, working overtime at the
time of the collision. The instant trip in which the
plaintiff/ appellant was injured was the first actual
emergency trip taken by the respondent driver. Respondent driver was in an obvious weakened physical condition as a result of having worked overtime.
And further, was suffering from pneumonia at the
time of the trip and at the time of the collision. See
deposition of Lee Cecil Hansen, pages 6, 9, 21 and
26.
For the purposes of the Summary Judgment,
counsel for respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation stipulated that Kennecott made it a practice to
charge each person who rode in the Kennecott
Ambulance $7.50, although it is suggested that said
charge does not fully compensate defendant for the
operation of the service. (R. 90-126)
The Second Cause of Action of appellant's
complaint alleged that the employees of Kennecott
Copper Corporation embarked upon a course of
emergency treatment to appellant, rendering first
aid and arranging and directing transportation of
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appellant in the emergency vehicle owned and operated by Kennecott Copper Corporation. The employees of Kennecott Copper Corporation during the
course of the treatment failed to take proper care
and precautions in securing appellant in the emergency vehicle which precautions are required by
standards of their occupation. They failed to carry
out the care they embarked upon in a reasonab!y
prudent manner, thereby placing appellant, a helpless patient, in a hazardous position of great peril,
culminating in great bodily injury and suffering by
appellant when respondent's vehicle collided with
another. (R. 50).
The Complaint of Appellant, therefore, alleged
causes of action arising out of two separate series
of facts. Those relating to the manner of treatment
received by Appellant from respondent's employees
and a cause of action arising out of the manner in
which respondent's employee drove respondent's
ambulance. (R. 48).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GUEST STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY
TO PRECLUDE AN ACTION ARISING
FROM ACTS OF ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE
OCCASIONED FR 0 M A CONTINUING
COURSE OF TREATMENT NOT RELATED
TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DRIVER OPERATED THE AMBULANCE.

To properly consider appellant's position, the
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course of treatment and the manner in which P3spondent' s employee operated the ambulance,
which were pleaded as separate causes of action,
must be viewed as separate occurrences. Those factors relating to the treatment received by appellant
from respondent's employees will be considered
here.
Upon receiving his injury on the job, appellant
was taken to the emergency medical facility owned
and operated by the Kennecott Copper Corporation,
whereupon respondent's employees voluntarily a.ssumed the responsibility for his care and embarked
upon a course of treatment, including dressing appellant's injury giving him a shot of demerol to relieve his pain; preparations for transport to a Salt
Lake area hospital; and actual transport to the hospital.
There is little dispute that the law, absent some
special relationship between the parties, such as,
Master-Servant; Carrier-Passenger; Invitor-Invitee,
imposes no legal obligation upon a person to offer
relief or assistance to a sick or helpless person.
Plunter v. Silver Associates, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 594, 186
Misc. 1025 (1946). In fact, no person is required to
assist a stranger, even though he can do so by :t
mere word and without the slightest danger to himself. Malloy v. Fong, 37 C. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241
(1951). Likewise, Kennecott Copper Corporation had
no duty to render treatment to the appellant. The
course of treatment was embarked upon voluntarily
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by the Kennecott Copper Corporation employees.
However, once the respondents voluntarily embarked upon a course of aid to the appellant, they
were obliged to use ordinary care in rendering such
aid. C. A. Buckeye S.S. Co. v. McDonough, 200 F.2d
558 (6 Cir. 1952), cert. den. 345 U.S. 926 (1953). See
also: Haralson v. Jones Truck Line, 223 Ark. 813, 270
S.W. 2d 892 (1954), 48 ALR 2d 248 (1956), which case
involved a signal by one truck driver to another of
clearance to pass and the passing truck killed pedestrians on the side of the road, and which case
held that the signaling truck driver, having assumed
a duty to warn, was required to exercise ordinary
care with respect thereto.
As Justice Benjamin Cordoza stated: "It is
ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to
the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Glanzer
v. Shepard, 233 NY 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922), 23
ALR 1425 (1923). See also: United States v. Lawter,
219 F. 2d 559 (5 Cir. 1955) which held the United
States liable for negligence of the Coast Guard in attempting a sea rescue by helicopter. This reasoning
has also been applied in cases involving damage
to property as well as to persons. The rationale is
the same. Thus, in Indian Towing Company v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) holding that once the Coast
Guard had exercised its discretion and had commenced to operate a lighthouse, the United States
was liable for the property damage caused by the
negligent operation of the lighthouse.
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Some courts take this position of liability based
upon the rationale that the defendant has worsened
plaintiff's position by affirmatively injuring plaintiff or increasing the danger or risk of harm. United
States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5 Cir. 1955); Steckman
v. Silver Moon, 90 N.W.2d 170 (1958), or by misleading plaintiff or inducing plaintiff's reliance, Marsalis
v. La Salle, 94 So. 2nd 120 (1957); Indian Towing Co.
v. U.S., supra; or by detering other would be volunteers from assisting the imperiled party. Lacey v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Mass. 1951); Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y. Supp.
134 (1935), aff'd. 247 App. Div. 867, 287 NY. Supp. 136
(1936). Admittedly, this position does not impose unlimited liability upon one who assumes to assist a:i
imperiled person. The courts have restricted the
liability of a volunteer to the limits of the voluntary
undertaking and to those injuries proximately
caused by his negligence. In Gudnestad v. Seaboard Coal Dock Co., 27 N.J. Super 227, 99 A.2d 201
(1953), mod. 15 N.J. 210, 104 A.2d 313 (1954), the defendant dock company voluntarily loaned a number
of its employees for the purpose of warning truck
drivers of one company whose trucks crossed railroad tracks in a dock and railroad yard area. The
plaintiff, an employee of another company, was
struck by a railroad freight car. The court refused
to extend the dock company's liability beyond the
bounds of the voluntary undertaking in behalf of
the one trucking company.
In the instant case the facts are undisputed that
respondents came to appellant's aid by offering care
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and treatment. The appellant was in a severe state of
shock and was given a shot of demerol by respondents, and under these circumstances, he was in a
passively helpless position and thereby dependent
upon respondents' aid. They likewise placed him in
a position of increased risk of harm. They were obligated to exercise ordinary care in assisting the appellant. Part of the care included placing appellant
in an ambulance. Ordinary care would require that
the stretcher upon which appellant was placed be
properly secured inside the ambulance. Ordinary
care would require that respondent's employees
properly secure appellant inside the ambulance.
They knew what condition appellant was in. They
knew what effect the demerol would have upon the
patient. The very nature of their training and employment would charge them with the knowledge
that ambulances often exceed the speed limits, that
ambulances are therefore exposed to a greater degree of risk and a greater possibility of having an
accident; and, that a person in the condition and
position of plaintiff, who because of his circumstances and because of the medication received and
the effects thereof, is in an imperiled position. That
the potential for harm to the plaintiff in his helpless
position was foreseeable by persons of the same
training, skill and experience of the respondents are
material question of fact and should be decided by
a jury.
The effect of the trial judge's granting of defend ant's motion for summary judgment based upon
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the Utah Guest Statute is to substantially reduce the
standard of care required of a volunteer from one of
ordinary negligence to the standard prescribed in
the Guest Statute. This is contrary to the great weight
of authority. Under the ruling of the trial court, the
plaintiff would have to allege and prove that the
injury resulting from defendant's treatment was the
proximate result of intoxication or willful misconduct
of the owner, driver or person responsible for the
operation of such vehicle. Clearly this was not a
result intended by the legislature.
POINT II
THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE DOES NOT
APPLY TO AMBULANCES.

The respondent's motion for summary judgment
was grounded upon the legal conclusion that the
guest statute applies to the relationship established
between appellant and respondent when appellant
was transported in respondent's ambulance. The
trial judge upheld this conclusion. However, it is
the appellant's position that the guest statute does
not govern ambulances and was never intended by
the legislature to apply to ambulances. Section 416-14, Utah Code Annotated (1953), governs the operation of emergency vehicles.
Subsection (b) provides:
"The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions pro-
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tect the driver from the consequences of an
arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in
this section." (Emphasis supplied)

The Utah Supreme Court has held an ambulance to be an emergency vehicle within the meaning of the foregoing statute. See Howe v. Jackson,
18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P2d 159 (l 966). Since subsection
(b) of the above-listed statute appears to establish
a standard of care for emergency vehicles, it is respectfully urged that the guest statute, which also
establishes a standard of care, does not apply to
emergency vehicles such as ambulances, but applies to private passenger vehicles or more particularly to vehicles other than emergency vehicles.
And that the action involved in the instant case, involving an emergency vehicle is not governed by
the Utah guest statute, and any judgment based
upon a contrary conclusion should be set aside.
POINT III
IF THE UTAH GUESTS TATUTE DOES
APPLY TO AMBULANCES, THE INSTANT
CASE IS SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED AS
BEING A VEHICLE FOR HIRE.

Respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, in
answer to appellant's request for admissions, admitted that they have on previous occasions charged
the sum of $7.50 for the type of ambulance service
rendered to the appelant herein. (R. 126). For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, respondent stipulated that Kennecott Copper did make it
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a practice to charge each person who rode in the
ambulance the $7 .50. (R. 91). The trial court, determined that the charge was insufficient to constitute "compensation" within the exceptions to the
guest statute. (R. 163). The court then decided that
"the motive which prompted defendant Kennecott
to carry plaintiff to the hospital was not an expected
payment of money.... " There are no facts indicating what was or was not "expected" by Kennecott
other than payment.
Section 41-9-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines a "Guest" to be a "person who accepts a ride
in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor. (Emphasis supplied). Persons giving compensation for
the ride are not within the guest statute. Jensen v.
Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683, (1956).
The facts in this case indicate that the respondent's vehicle was one for hire. The charge was
$7.50. This sum constituted the compensation expected by Kennecott Copper Corporation for the
service. The respondent was holding its service out
to the public as evidenced by the fact that appellant was not an employee of respondent but was
still able to utilize the ambulance service. These
facts are sufficient to remove the case from the
standards set out in the guest statute yet the trial
judge held the appellant to be a guest. The Court,
in its memorandum decision, (R. 103) indicates tha.t
the stipulated charge did not constitute compensation. The Court also was concerned with the ade-
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quacy of the amount charged and concluded that
the charge of $7.50 would not constitute compensation under the guest statute. (R. 159-163). The sufficiency of the amount charged, as a consideration
of the applicability of the "passenger giving compensation" exemption to the guest statute, has already been before this Honorable Court. In Jensen
v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956), the
defendant driver charged his passenger $3.50 per
week of five days or $.70 per round trip to and from
work. On appeal, the appellant driver contended
that the plaintiff respondent had not shown that the
amount to be paid by respondent was equal to or
more than what " ... it cost appellant to transport
respondent, he was not giving compensation for his
ride and was, therefore, a guest and not entitled to
recover against appellant for ordinary negligence."
Jensen v. Mower, supra, at page 341.
The Court, in responding to defendant driver's
contention said, at page 341and342:
"We are of the opinion that it was not the
intention of the Legislature to have the status
of a rider as to being a guest or passenger determined by any nice distinction as suggested
by appellant. The formula would depend on too
many factors, such as ( 1) the number of riders,
(2) the type of car, (3) the miles per gallon
of gasoline, etc. Thus, a single passenger riding
would probably never pay the necessary amount
to make the driver whole. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, many riders in one car
would pay only a small fraction of what would
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be required of one or two riders. It cannot be
contended that every rider of a bus or taxicab
pays his full proportion of what is required to
completely make the operator whole."

Therefore, the fact that the persons using the
Kennecott Ambulance Service were charged the
sum of $7.50 would appear to be sufficient to bring
the relationship between appellant and respondent
within the rule of the Mower case, and therefore exempted from the applicability of the guest statute
by reason of being a passenger giving compensation. This conclusion would also comport with the
literal sense of the words of the guest statute. In determining who are guests within the meaning of
automobile guest statutes, the enactments should
not be extended beyond the correction of the evils
which induced their enactment. They were designed
to relieve the harshness of the common law rule
which requires the exercise of ordinary care even
though a person is a recipient of the driver's kindness and hospitality. Clarke v. Storchak, 53 N.E.2d
229, 384 Ill. 564 (1944), appeal dismissed 332 U.S.
713 (1944). Another reason was the prevention of
collusive suits.
Whether a person is a guest depends upon the
particular facts in each case, and the qUestion of
status is not determined by the intention of the occupant of the vehicle alone. Connett v. Winget, 30
N.E.2d 1, 374 Ill. 531 (1940).
One important element in determining whether
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a person is a guest is the identity of the person or
persons advantaged by the carriage. If, in its direct
operation it confers a benefit only on the person to
whom the ride is given, and no benefits, other than
those which are incidental to hospitality, companionship, or the like upon the person extending the
invitation, the passenger is a guest; but, if his carriage tends to promote the mutual interests of both
himself and the driver and operates as a common
benefit Crawford v. Foster, 293 P. 841, 110 Cal. App.
81 (1930), or if the ride is primarily for the attainment
of some objective or purpose of the operator,
Fachadio v. Krovitz, 144 P.2d 646, 62 Cal. App.2d
362 (1944) he is not a guest.
Another element in determining the status of
a rider in the vehicle of another is the relationship
between the parties to the lawsuit. This element is
apparent from a survey of the various Utah cases
involving the Utah guest statute. In the case of
Greenhalgh v. Green, 16 Utah 2d 221, 398 P.2d 691
(1965), the plaintiff and defendant were friends who
were going on a deer hunt together and had agreed
to share expenses. (Emphasis supplied). In Milligan
v. Harward, 11 Utah 2d 395, 355 P.2d 62 (1960), the
plaintiff and defendant had been together as drinking ••buddies" immediately before the accident. (Emphasis supplied). In Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d
395, 424 P.2d 142 (1967), the court observed that the
parties were good friends prior to the accident and that
the two friends were now engaged in a law suit. Supra, at
page 396. (Emphasis supplied). Smith v. franklin, 14
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Utah 2d 16, 376 P.2d 691 (1965), involved a plaintiff
and defendant who were cousins.
All of the foregoing cases held that the plaintiff
was a guest in the defendant's vehicle and was
therefore precluded from recovering because of the
host-guest relationship. The opportunity for collusion among persons enjoying the above-enumerated
relationships is obvious. This opportunity was not
present in the instant case. The ambulance driver
had never seen Mr. Willden before the date of the
accident. Neither had the technician at the emergency station seen Mr. Willden prior to the time of the
accident. They were not friends, drinking buddies
or good friends, nor were they cousins.
On the other hand, in Stack v. Kearnes, 118
Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594 (1950), the plaintiff had met defendant at a party and had accepted a ride home.
There had been no previous social contract between
the parties nor did any family relationship exist between the parties. Although the case was primarily
concerned with the question of willful misconduct
by the defendant, the court did observe that the
parties to the lawsuit were not good friends and reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that there
was sufficient evidence to submit the case to a jury.
Similarly, in the Mower case, supra., there was no relationship other than that of fellow employees who
had been solicited as paying passengers by the defendant driver.
The fact that appellant would have been
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charged $7.50 for the ambulance service, fully intended to pay for the ride, was not a friend, relative
or in some other position of relationship with respondent; and was a complete stranger to respondent and its employees were sufficient material
facts bearing upon the question of the legal relationship existing between the parties to require a submission of the case to the jury for determination.
Where a dispute exists as to what were the respective purposes or conditions for or upon which the
transportation was undertaken, relative to the nature
and existence, if any, of the benefits conferred upon
the respective parties, it is ordinarily a question of
fact whether or not the invitee was a guest withb
the meaning of the statutes. Humphreys v. San Francisco Area Council, Boy Scouts of America, 22 Cal.
2d 436, 139 P.2d 941 (1943); Albrecht v. Safeway
Stores, 159 Or. 331, 80 P.2d 62 (1938).
In Voreg v. Shepard Ambulance Service, Inc.,
44 Wash, 2d 528, 268 P.2d 642 (1954). The action was
brought by a husband and wife against defendant,
the ambulance company, for injuries to the wife resulting from her fall from defendant's ambulance.
The lower court dismissed the action. On appeal,
the case was reversed. The appellate court holding
that the existence of the host-guest relationship between automobile owner and his passenger is a factual question for the jury, unless reasonable minds
could reach but one conclusion under the facts of a
particular case.
It is respectfully submitted that there were suf-
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ficient facts bearing upon the legal relationship of
the parties to require a submission of the case to a
jury.

POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFI APPELLANT DID NOT
"ACCEPT" A RIDE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE.

Utah Code Annotated, 41-9-1 (Repl. Vol. 1960)
reads, in part, as follows:
"Any person who as a guest ACCEPTS a ride
in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public
highways in the State of Utah, and while so
riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against the
owner or driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle." (Emphasis supplied)

Utah Code Annotated, 41-9-2 (Repl. Vol. 1960)
defines a guest" as a person who rr ACCEPTS" a ride
in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor. (Emphasis supplied).
II

The word "accepts" imports both knowing and
voluntary acceptance and does not include either
an involuntary or forced ride. Rocha v. Hulen, 6
Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935). Held that a 5
year old child who without her consent or the consent of either of her parents was taken by a motorist for the purpose of conevying the child to a hospital was not a guest in the defendant's vehicle.
The facts of the case show that Mr. Willden did
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not "Accept" a ride in defendant's vehicle. When
he arrived at the emergency facility he was in a
state of shock. He was given a shot of demerol, a
narcotic drug that has a dulling and depressing effect, thereby rendering his ability to "Accept''
nugatory. After being taken from the emergency
station he was placed, without his acceptance, into
defendant's ambulance. See deposition of Lee Cecil
Hansen, page 10 lines 13-28; Milo McHenry, pages
9 lines 15-25, page 10 lines 1-25 and page 22 line 20;
and Allen Thomas Willden page 21 lines 12 & 13,
page 24 and 25.
A literal reading of the guest statute and the
definition of guest, as quoted above, together with
the above-cited case would limit the applicability
of the statute to those persons who volitionally and
affirmatively "accept" a ride in the vehicle of another. The facts of this case indicate that Mr. Willden was in no condition to accept or reject the defendant's rendering of services; he did not consent;
therefore, the guest statute does not apply.
POINT V
THERE E X I S T SUFFICIENT UNRESOLVED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
THAT RENDER THE GRANTING OF THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER.

When a party moves for summary judgment,
that party has the burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to the facts necessary to establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law. Housley v. Anaconda Co., 14 Utah 2d 124, 427
P.2d 390 (1967), where defendant had been sued by
plaintiffs for personal injuries and property damage
caused when one Cox, driving automobile owned
by defendant, crashed into the rear of their car. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that at the time of the collision Cox had not been
acting within the scope of his employment. In support of the motion, defendant filed the deposition
of Cox (who had departed the state) and an affidavit
of another of defendant's employees, in which affiant stated that company autos were not to be used
on personal business. The deposition of Cox revealed that he had been going home for lunch when
he collided with plaintiff's car. The trial court granted
the motion and rendered summary judgment for
defendant. On plaintiff's appeal, this court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for trial, finding that the self-serving averments in the supporting
materials were insufficiently conclusive on the issue
of agency. See also: West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87,
387 P.2d 686 (1963); Plewe Constr. Co. v. Franklin
Nat. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 403, 360 P.2d 599 (1961);
Green v. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375, 376, 359 P.2d 1050,
1952 (1961); Lundberg v. Backman, 9 Utah 2d 58,
337 P.2d 433 (1959) and Welchman v. Wood 9, Utah
2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959).
In the instant case there are numerous unresolved factual issues that are material to a proper
determination of the case. For instance, on the question of the treatment rendered by respondent's em-
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ployees, did its employees exercise ordinary
care in treating appellant; were they negligent in
the manner in which they placed plaintiff, a helpless person, into the ambulance; were the injuries
sustained by the appellant the foreseeable result
of the manner in which respondents placed plaintiff
into the ambulance? What was the relationship
established between the parties? Was it one of imperiled person and volunteer? Did the respondents
increase the risk of harm to appellant? All of the
foregoing questions are material to the second cause
of action of plaintiff's complaint wherein a negligent course of treatment was alleged. There is little
evidence in the record that would controvert plaintiff's allegations.
Concerning the question of whether appellant
was a guest or a passenger for hire, the questions
posed include the following: Was there compensation for the ride? What were the purposes and conditions upon which the transport of appellant was
undertaken? What benefits did Kennecott expect to
receive? What benefits did they receive?
Each of the foregoing questions of fact are material to the determination of the status of the appellant with respect to the respondent. Was the appellant a guest or a passenger paying compensation?
The foregoing questions must be answered before
this final question can be answered.
Even the trial judge recognized that there were
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material unresolved factual issues. (R. 153, 159, 162
& 163).
There is also a factual dispute that would have
a bearing upon the degree of care exercised by the
ambulance driver when he approached the intersection. Lee Cecil Hansen, the driver, testified that
he did not apply his brakes prior to the collision.
See deposition of Lee Cecil Hansen, page 38 line 25.
Milo McHenry, the technician at the medical facility was also in the ambulance with Hansen. He testified that the ambulance driver applied his brakes
upon approaching the intersection. See deposition
of Milo McHenry, page 26 lines 7-9. A jury would
be the proper body to decide the conflicting testimony. See Ricciuti v. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269
P.2d 282 (1954).
The foregoing unresolved issues of fact are material to the proper disposition of the case. They
show that the granting of respondent's motion for
summary judgment was improper and should be
set aside.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, appellant respectfully prays that this Court reverse the trial court's
decision appealed from in the following particulars:
1. By determining that negligent acts occurring during a continuing course of treatment not related to the manner in which the driver of a vehicle
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operates the vehicle are not governed by the Utah
Guest Statute.
2. Determining that the Utah Guest Statute does
not apply to ambulances.
3. Determination that appellant was a passenger in respondent's vehicle for hire rather than a
guest.
4. Ruling that the term "Acceptance" as used
in the Utah Guest Statute, requires a conscious or
knowing affirmation of assent to the ride offered in
the vehicle of another.
5. That there were sufficient disputed material
facts raised in the lower court to require submission
of the case to the ultimate trier of fact.
6. Setting aside the summary judgment of the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
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